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Showing posts with label UAS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UAS. Show all posts

31 July 2013

"Blimp" = Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS)? [video]

Raytheon's "Blimp," or JLENS, will someday be deployed over Washington D.C.  As shown in the Company's video, the early warning surveillance system can perform a number of tasks -- all while remaining aloft for up to 30 days. It recently completed a series of tests at a Utah facility. Raytheon believes the platform is capable of providing minutes of warning vs. the seconds that conventional airborne systems typically offer.

What is the threat? According to its proponents, the JLENS could help detect or deter anti-ship sea-skimming cruise missiles, ground targets UAVs and swarming boats (think USS Cole bombing) by providing continuous detection and fire control data. For example, Raytheon claims in the promo that conventional radar can only detect anti-ship cruise missiles could be detected only seconds from their intended target. Instead, under some circumstances, JLENS could alert defenders at time of launch.


Although JLENS was envisioned for use in the Persian Gulf, some believe that protection of U.S., seaways and waterways, has not received adequate attention by Homeland Security.  

Knowlengr: Knowledge Engineering Analysis 

The JLENS airship (actually two aerostats) could represent a ready-made Big Data application. Its sensors could provide long term monitoring, making possible what Raytheon calls "patterns of life over time." That could bring terabytes of information. Which of course, bring to mind the long-discussed fusion challenges to be overcome for maritime situation awareness.

This story via George Leopard at Defense Systems.

20 April 2011

Army UAS Operators: It's About Information, not Airborne Weaponry

As part of its Blogger Roundtable program, DoD offered journalists access to three Army UAS operators to discuss their work. Two were UAS Shadow operators, while another worked on Raven. The operators discussed their training and how they got into the Army's UAS programs. 

Possible R&D Area One of the operators mentioned additional challenges faced by UAS controllers when coordinating air with ground robotics operations. SUAS (small UAS) and ground robotics are an emerging area where stateside tests are still ongoing. According to this operator, line of sight is currently only 300 ft with the ground robots; a larger range, say to 1000 ft, would be helpful to operators and ground personnel. 

The main application discussed for these UAS systems was reconnaissance. 

Baseline training for the Shadow is approximately 7 months, though only "a couple of weeks" is reportedly needed for basic usage. On the other hand, one of the trainers on hand said that the XBox generation is extremely adept at learning how to operate Raven, Puma or Wasp.  Trainees find that it's "the best video game in the world," said a trainer. The trainer went on to say that it's not so much the damage inflicted by this or other classes of UAS, but rather the value of information they provide, especially in support of ground operations. The Shadow requires two operators and a mission liaison (camera + pilot + mission liaison), whereas the portable Raven requires only a laptop-equipped soldier. Some of items on soldier wishlists include longer battery life, shortages of UAS inventory and operators. Best uses? To discover IEDs and IED-placement activities, route clearance, support for special operations, added situational awareness for the brigade commander for operations in progress. One operator noted that the Ravens can fly in at building-top level and begin surveillance, which can serve as a deterrent to some adversary operations.  

Each brigade has only one Shadow system. The Army's complete UAS inventory, in order of size, includes Gray Eagle, Hunter, Shadow, Puma, Raven, Wasp

Information more than bullets In response to a reporter's question about possible moral issues with UAS warfare-at-a-distance, the operators reminded the press that typically the UAS is used for information gathering. Many are not weaponized; in the course of their careers, some operators will never touch a weaponized UAS. 

On the other hand, as one operator said, the presence of UAS in the battlefield has meant that tactics are constantly evolving. For some soldiers on the ground, these operators believe, the sound of a noisy Shadow overhead is a comfortable presence.

25 June 2009

CBS 60 Minutes Segments on UAS

UAV Platform H: Is Human Factors Engineering up to the Task?

Platform H is a designator being given for human - unmanned military systems. As reported by C4ISR Journal (May 2009, p. 16). The next version of the Apache Longbow will give some crews the ability to control a UAV and fire its weapons. Some of the next generation (634 Block III) Longbows will include a capability for a copilot-gunner to "control a UAV, steer its sensors and order it to fire weapons." Advocates for the new design believe the new communications system that enables this -- called the Unmanned Aerial Systems Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) -- will limit Longbow exposure to ground fire and extend its targeting range to 40 km.

Some Longbows in theatre in Afghanistan and Iraq already have UAV full-motion video streamed to the cockpits, but it's a one-way proposition, and targeting information is not integrated with the onboard Longbow instruments.

The story's author, Keith Button, relays some doubts from other experts, but says the Army is confident of this approach.

In a simulation conducted in Huntsville in the summer of 2008, crews with a UTA were able to monitor an additional target, reportedly without performance degradation. Button quotes a former F-16 pilot who believes that up to four UAV's can be controlled under routine conditions, but that live fire conditions in the heat of battle require a "one mind, one mission" focus.

I confess to making up the designator "Platform H." But as this evolving technology makes clear, especially as the debate about limiting civilian casualties in so-called"drone attacks" continues to undermine political will to wage a UAS-enabled war, human factors research will be called upon for tough judgements. U.S. military research institutions have a history of strong research in human factors, but investments in that discipline may not be up the task of determining what is possible, safe and manageable with Platform H.